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Abstract: This article aims to illustrate the complexity of the relationships between digital par-
ticipation spaces and organisations related to the Southern-European and US socialist tradi-
tions. Digital communication and, in particular, the various platforms of digital participation 
have been long living between the illusion of techno-libertarian thrusts and the technocratic 
tendencies framing the New Public Management approach. The suspicion of socialist-inspired 
parties but also of post-Marxist social movements towards the digital is connected on the one 
hand to the organisational structure of the parties and on the other hand to the capacity of 
neoliberalism to incorporate digital innovation in its cultural horizon. Participation platforms 
have often been functional to the emergence of a neoliberalism with a human face, capable of 
offering potential spaces of participation that depoliticise civic activism and transform it into a 
mere technical tool of minimal governance. In recent years, however, digital party experiences 
have developed in the context of left-wing organisations. In other cases, digital platforms have 
been used as tools of mobilisation and even as instruments for the creation of a new senti-
mental connections with the increasingly fragmented “popular classes”. Digital has thus be-
come a “space of struggle”, in the same meaning it was used in the 1980s by Stuart Hall. This 
article presents the first findings of a research project on the use of digital platforms by: a) 
parties of socialist inspiration in Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and the USA; and b) bottom-up 
social movements. The analysis follows an empirical approach based on: a) the analysis of 
organisations; b) content analysis (Evaluation Assertion Analysis) of political and policy docu-
ments on the use of digital as a tool for political struggle; c) in-depth interviews to digital activ-
ists of social movements. 
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1. Introduction 
Politically, the broad masses only exist insofar as they are organized within po-
litical parties. The changes of opinion which occur among the masses under 
pressure from the determinant economic forces are interpreted by the parties, 
which first split into tendencies and then into a multiplicity of new organic parties. 
Through this procedure of disarticulation, new association and fusion of homo-
geneous entities, a more profound and intimate process of breakdown of dem-
ocratic society is revealed. This leads to a definitive alignment of conflicting clas-
ses, for preservation or for conquest of power over the state and productive 
apparatus (Gramsci 1921, in Forgacs 1999, 121-122).  
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Gramsci’s statement, which first appeared in L’Ordine Nuovo on 25 September 1921, 
accurately describes a process of disarticulation that – in other forms – has been rep-
resentative of the distinctive character of the transformation of political partiesGramsci 
himself had been developing the idea of the party as a collective intellectual, an ele-
ment of a complex society in which the concretization of a collective will is recognized 
and partially established in action (see Gramsci Prison Notebook 13, 1; now in Forgacs 
1999, 238-243). The party, in this sense, carries out an educational function and polit-
ical direction of the class it represents: this function is possible only because the party 
is a “collective”. 
The processes of parties’ transformation – and in particular those of the socialist 
tradition – have made the collective dimension marginal, favouring the aggregation of 
individual requests. In this scenario, digital technologies can play different roles: 
a) they can function as mere tools to support consensus building;  
b) they can become organizational facilitation tools;  
c) they can constitute a terrain of political struggle for hegemony;  
and, finally,  
d) they can promote the development of a new digital socialism, also helping to re-
connect people with politics. However, these roles are not always necessarily alterna-
tive. 
This article aims at discussing the role of digital technologies in the political life of 
some European left-wing parties and in the organisational models of radical left social 
movements. In particular, here we present the first findings coming from the study of 
policy documents on digital technologies produced by some socialist/labourist/left-wing 
parties and the very first considerations taken from some of the many in-depth inter-
views with digital activists of a number of social movements. 
In the following sections we will try to shed light on: a) the role of socialist parties in 
the framework of transformations of representation, trying to identify the relationships 
among intermediate bodies, processes of depoliticisation and development of the so-
called post-representative politics (section 2); b) the role that technologies play in these 
processes and, in particular, how the techno-enthusiasm forms are functional to a cap-
italism with a human face but still hardly neoliberal (section 3); c) the role of platform 
parties on the one hand and digital technologies for communication as different out-
comes of political re-organization processes on the other hand (section 4); d) the role 
and function of social movements in the emergence of new forms of re-politicisation 
which is indispensable for the emergence of a new digital socialism.  
2. Political Parties in a Post-Representative World 
The many different theorisations of representation (Pitkin 1967; Brito Vieira and Run-
ciman 2008; Pettit 2009; Saward 2010) choose different perspectives. Both the bipar-
tition between Pitkin's (1967) standing for and acting for, and the new perspectives,  
which are less focused on a binary logic, seem in part unfit for interpreting the change 
in the dynamics of relations between representatives and represented, in particular in 
the scenario of the media politics. The different theorisations, however, keep open the 
old question of political representation and its relationship with liberal democracy. The 
mandate of the elected can only be free (since assuming a delegation contract means 
making the individual's autonomy disappear) but, at the same time, the elected must 
place themselves in the position of being controlled by the voters. In other words, rep-
resentatives play an active role (legislative function) and must therefore enjoy a certain 
autonomy, being capable of going beyond the electoral exercise. At the same time, 
precisely because of this role, they must in some way “depend” on the electorate. The 
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paradox is evident: if the representatives had an imperative mandate, they should only 
respond to a client (theoretically plural, in practice traceable in the leader) or respond 
only to themselves (and in this case they would be totally released from any control). 
That is, representative democracy works only if we avoid an opposition between im-
perative mandate and free mandate (Urbinati 2013), making sure that the latter is tem-
pered by some form of popular control. The political mandate, in other words, still 
needs parties (or similar organizations), as explained very clearly by Nadia Urbinati 
(2013, 99). 
Representation has a very strong connection with another concept that cannot be 
underestimated: citizenship. Representation, in effect, is a relationship between a so-
cial group and a representative who shares the group’s interests, expectations, values, 
problems, territorial emergencies and so on. It can be affirmed, at this point that without 
social inclusion – made possible by the logic of political representation or similar pro-
cesses – citizenship does not even exist and therefore that no representation can exist 
without representation. It is a syllogism not without ambiguity but substantially correct. 
One of the outcomes of the democracy of organised distrust is represented by the 
emergence of new forms of social surveillance and political militancy. Among the latter, 
significant positions belong to advocacy groups, expressions of active citizenship 
(Moro 2013), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), observatories on specific is-
sues and campaigns (in many cases organized through digital platforms) and the re-
sults of actions in the territory (such as the Stop-TTIP, No-Ceta, etc. campaigns). In 
many cases, these organisations (campaigns first and foremost but also different ad-
vocacy groups) do not “represent” in the traditional sense, do not have membership 
structures, and are mostly single-issue (i.e. oriented to a specific cause). They carry 
out activities of influence and, in some cases, activities of lobbying (Ceccarini and Di-
amanti 2018, 351). In light of new organised forms, representative democracy seems 
to give way not only to counter-democratic demands but also to what John Keane 
(2009) calls monitory democracy. A monitoring carried out both through lobbying prac-
tices and through the legitimization of tools coming from the tradition of deliberative 
democracy (Elstub and McLaverty 2014), such as citizen juries, deliberative polls, city 
assemblies, online consultations, petitions, and finally through organizations for moni-
toring and protection, such as consumer movements or associations for human rights. 
The Internet constitutes a “workplace” that facilitates the emergence and rooting of 
these experiences, although it does not constitute an activation element. 
The monitorial citizen (as in the expression of Michael Schudson [1998]) tends to 
effectively replace both the citizen voters and even the critical citizens (Norris 1999). 
In this new scenario, representative democracy – based on a direct relationship be-
tween citizens and legislative assemblies – gives way to post-representative politics 
(Keane 2013), in which citizens can experience forms of creative activism that are not 
always consistent with the traditions of political representation through party organiza-
tions. 
At this point, we already have some critical elements. We have probably entered a 
political phase that can actually be defined “post-representative”, in which forms –  
sometimes very controversial – of “direct representation” (De Blasio and Sorice 2019) 
emerge. At the same time, the institutional fabric of liberal democracies is still based 
on the mechanisms and logics of representation. Hence the need to consider political 
parties is inescapable, although their credibility and their own social legitimacy have 
been severely tested both by economic crises (Morlino and Raniolo 2018) and by the 
(alleged) crisis of institutional representation. This is an almost paradoxical situation 
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that has affected, however, most severely those parties that had a strong organisa-
tional root and were deprived of both their social legitimacy and their ties to the territory 
in one fell swoop. In this framework, the parties inherited from those of mass integration 
– essentially the parties of the socialist / social-democratic and communist tradition – 
were the most affected, precisely because their “heavy” organisation did not lend itself 
to transformations that were too rapid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Political parties, depoliticisation and post-representative politics 
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However, we must also consider some forms of political dealignment that have affected 
the socialist/labourist parties. The use of the discursive strategy of economic “realism”, 
for example, has certainly represented an element of criticality. This aspect, however, 
had already been noted by Stuart Hall in 1988, when the expression “new realism” was 
used to indicate a substantial transformation of the Labour Party, capable of aggregat-
ing electoral consensus but not activating “sentimental connection”:  
It [the Labour Party] can mobilize the vote, provided it remains habitually solid. 
But it shows less and less capacity to connect with popular feelings and senti-
ments, let alone to transform them or articulate them to the left. It gives the 
distinct impression of a political party living on the capital of past connections 
and imageries, but increasingly out of touch with what is going on in everyday 
life around it (Hall 1988, 207). 
A simplified graphic representation of the transformation involving the mass political 
parties is presented in figure 1. It is evident how different factors influence or have a 
role in this transformation. At the same time, it is useful to note that these transfor-
mations could be better understood if we study them in the frame of neoliberal ideol-
ogy’s rising. The emphasis on technology and on the insurgence of the “information 
society”, for example, are the outcomes of a neo-capitalist approach and the left-wing 
parties across Europe have under-evaluated the role of communication in the intricated 
relationships among state, market and social actors, as clearly stated by Dallas 
Smythe more than forty years ago (Smythe 1977)1. 
3. Political Parties Between De-politicisation and Digital Enthusiasm  
Moreover, over the last thirty years storytelling about overcoming the “old” categories 
of right and left  has become hegemonic, to the point of being considered a trait of 
cultural “modernity” and even scientifically based. The idea that the political categories 
of right and left were outdated was preceded by the development of a broad literature 
on the “end of ideologies” (Fukuyama 1992): several positions developed within it, 
some more distinctly technocratic, others that identified in the development of shared 
deliberative processes and in the affirmation of collaborative governance the only ele-
ments necessary for the qualitative increase of democracy. The success of economic 
approaches such as that of the Chicago School or of paradigms such as New Public 
Management has favoured the legitimacy of these positions.  
The beginning of the 21st century, however, has been characterised by various 
phenomena:  
a) the revival of nationalisms and religious fundamentalisms;  
b) the explosion of the economic crisis of the Western world, that was generated 
precisely by those economic recipes that had achieved media and political success but 
proved to be unsuitable for solving the structural problems of the world economy 
(Crouch 2011);  
c) the rebirth of the various populisms and the emergence of the “challenger par-
ties” (mainly right-wing), often connected precisely to the criticism of the liberal system;  
d) the onset of several popular protest movements, which attacked the outcomes 
of liberal democracy precisely by demanding more participatory political processes 
and, generally, “more democracy”.   
                                            
1 Christian Fuchs (2014, 14) correctly notes that “the role of mediatization, ICTs and knowledge 
work in contemporary capitalism was anticipated by Marx’s focus on the general intellect”. 
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This last aspect, in particular, has brought to light the democratic short circuit: not only 
the historical inconsistency of the alleged overcoming of right and left but also the ap-
parent paradox of a criticism conducted towards liberal democracy because perceived 
as being rather insensitive to requests for people participation. 
The processes of de-politicisation have been studied by different authors (Mouffe 
2005; Rancière 2010; Žižek 1999) with components that are sometimes different but 
always referable to the idea of a substantial loss of centrality of politics as belonging 
and project: in other words, politics has often been reduced to only a dimension of 
policy, with a substantial marginalization both of the ideological conflict and of polity as 
a project community. 
Colin Hay (2007) has clearly highlighted the relationship between the so-called anti-
politics, the tendencies of the resurgent populisms and some aspects of the neoliberal 
turning point. The process of depoliticisation has thus been framed within the develop-
ment of complex social phenomena, some of which underpin the post-political ten-
dency that seems to have characterized the last decade of Western democracies. In 
this scenario, we can see how some of the political-institutional innovations theoreti-
cally oriented to the growth of participation (such as, for example, the experiences of 
collaborative governance, some variations of e-government and different public con-
sultation tools) have been absorbed into internal trends of substantial anesthetization 
of any forms of social conflict and, in general, of popular participation. 
In fact, these innovations have proved to be mechanisms of political legitimisation 
for the political élites, obtaining on the one hand their own failure with respect to the 
objectives (increasing the amount and awareness of popular participation) and on the 
other hand, their rejection by the popular classes that have interpreted them (not with-
out some reason) as “top-down” tools also perceiving them as strategies of the élites. 
To the forms of innovation – often however supported in good faith by local administra-
tions and scholars – some institutional reforms have been added, and are often used 
as tactics and tools for the affirmation of a post-political neoliberal projects (Flinders 
and Buller 2006). Both institutional reforms and some experiences of democratic inno-
vation have thus turned out to be “mechanisms used by politicians to depoliticise is-
sues, including delegation, but also for the creation of binding rules and the formation 
of discursive preference shaping” (Fawcett et al. 2017, 5)2. 
In this situation, the semantic shift from the idea of “government” to the notion of 
“governance” should also be considered: it constitutes one of the elements that ac-
companies the emergence of the so-called “post-political” and of the reduction of poli-
tics to only economic concerns.  
These post-political tendencies are outcomes of the depoliticisation, and they have 
been very often accompanied by the phenomena of re-politicisation within the rhetoric 
of “governability”. This last component has been often wrapped in a “common sense 
neoliberalism”, fed by the rhetoric on the “light state”, that of efficiency3 at the expense 
of the quality of democracy and of the commodification of citizenship (Crouch 2003). 
The “common sense neoliberalism” that emerged in the late 1990s could be contrasted 
only re-discovering the educative role of politics. “Politics, as Gramsci insisted, is al-
ways ‘educative’. We must acknowledge the insecurities which underlie common 
sense’s confusion and contradictions and harness the intensity and anger which 
comes through in many of the readers’ comments” (Hall and O’Shea 2015, 65).  
                                            
2 Johan Hartle (2017), studying the political ontology of Lukàcs and Debord, analyses the pro-
cess of reification as a form of structural de-politicisation. 
3 In many fields of social life, the concept of efficiency has been supported by the rhetoric on 
“meritocracy”, coherently functional to the neoliberal project (see Littler 2017). 
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On the other hand, the insurgence and development of digital technologies for com-
munication have deeply changed the scenario. The old techno-libertarian tendencies 
of the sixties re-emerged, merging with the (fundamentally technocratic) rhetoric of 
technology as an instrument of democratization of capitalism and of improving admin-
istrative efficiency. The new “participatory culture” (Fuchs 2016, 87) would also be ca-
pable of replacing elective assemblies and giving more (presumed) power to citizens. 
This techno-enthusiast ideology is an “expressions of the capitalist fetishism of tech-
nology that Marx criticised” (Fuchs 2016, 207).  
In this way, digital technologies have entered the imaginary at two levels: the first 
level is a hyper-optimistic techno-enthusiasm that has fundamentally considered the 
digital as a shortcut to recover the participation that had diminished in the territory; the 
second, more critical level, has identified in the digital technologies the tools for a tech-
nocratic control of the organization of the State and of political life. 
4. Towards the Platform Party 
Very often digital technologies and, in particular, their applications to the e-government 
have been functional to the New Public Management approach (De Blasio and Sorice 
2016), activating an ideological transformation of the “public” (perceived as old) in the 
efficiencyst idea of the state-company (Crouch 2011; Sorice 2014). 
There are also many parties of different orientations which adopt platforms of dem-
ocratic participation: significantly, however, the wealth of possibilities for online delib-
eration remains confined to a few exceptions. 
The thesis that the Internet would have led to the emergence of claims and the 
development of political movements from the non-leading horizontal structure does not 
actually find empirical confirmations but has instead been contradicted by numerous 
studies. In a rather hasty manner, digital activism was considered to be the character-
izing aspect of the new political movements and to be the outcome required of digital 
media; in fact, many studies have shown that movements with a strong online pres-
ence have at least as strong a presence within a territory (Kreiss 2012; della Porta and 
Rucht 2013). Another common place idea is that the movements would always be hor-
izontal, without a hierarchical structure and without a leader, by virtue of the fact that 
they would borrow not only the dynamics of transmitting messages but also the mo-
dalities of the adoption of decisions. In fact, in the study conducted by Donatella della 
Porta and Dieter Rucht (2013), diversified forms of power and conflict are also identi-
fied in the global justice movements, while Paolo Gerbaudo (2012) spoke of a “chore-
ography of the assembly” in which the collective dimension of the protest is organised 
and staged by an elite group of activists. These frame elements are useful for under-
standing the scenario in which both the forms of online participation “from below” and 
the so-called platform parties are born and develop.  
The studies on platform parties are the result of a long reflection on the transfor-
mation of the political parties. From the classifications of Duverger (1951) to those of 
Kirchheimer (1966) up to the fundamental work of Stein Rokkan (1970) to finally the 
analysis on the emergence of the “cartel parties” (Katz and Mair 1994), various studies 
on the organizational form of the so-called intermediate bodies have taken place. The 
development of personal, presidentialised, liquid-presidentialised parties (Prospero 
2012) and even franchise-parties (Bardi, Bartolini and Trechsel 2014) have marked the 
last decades, framed by the crisis of legitimacy of the traditional parties. The rhetoric 
of participation (“participationism”) has also accompanied the emergence of new or-
ganizational forms of politics, although such rhetoric has been reduced to a generic 
“openness to society” and programmatically refuses an internal organization based on 
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deliberative and participatory logics. In this context, even the use of primary elections 
(in small as in large scale) responds to a rhetoric of participation but often ends up 
being just a tool for legitimizing the party elite. The accentuation of the refusal to par-
ticipate or a distrust in politics and, in particular, in the political parties by the citizens 
is not surprising in this context 
Very often it was thought – in a somewhat naive manner – that to favour participa-
tion and to increase the internal democracy of a party it would be enough to enlarge 
the selectorate of the party itself4. In reality it is not enough to enlarge the selectorate, 
as is evident from the crisis of credibility (and sometimes even legitimacy) that has hit 
the traditional parties – and often precisely those with more deep-rooted popular tradi-
tions – in the Western representative democracies over the last twenty years 
One of the responses to the representation deficit – and to the related refusal of 
participation through the only electoral delegation – has come in recent years from the 
adoption of communication technologies, in particular those connected to the Internet 
and, more generally, to the opportunities offered by the development of democratic 
participation platforms (De Blasio 2018). In many cases, these technologies have been 
framed as neutral tools, but “far from being considered only as tools, media and com-
munication technologies have become a site of struggle in their own right, and as such 
are subject to object conflicts” (Hess 2005, 516, cited in Milan 2013, 2). 
In this scenario, we have been focused on the rise of the so-called platform party 
(also defined as the “digital party”5). This type of party finds new organisational meth-
ods in Internet tools and in participatory platforms. Platform parties are born from par-
ticipative logic. However, in many cases they are revealed as results of the hyper-
representation phenomena. The leader (the supreme representative of all the people) 
creates a symbolic connection with the super-people (the superbase in the analysis of 
Gerbaudo [2019]), the one represented by the active people in platforms of digital par-
ticipation. The participation evoked in this type of party is of a dualistic nature. The 
emphasis on direct democracy, however, often delegitimises any form of participatory 
democracy. There are obviously many types of the platform party and they are affected 
by national peculiarities and electoral systems. However, they are a response to the 
growing popular need for participation, albeit in intermittent forms and with a personal 
and daily commitment (Ceccarini and Diamanti 2018). In essence, platform parties use 
technology as an organisational mode and as a structural architecture. At the same 
time, they use digital participation platforms as mobilisation tools, as spaces for policy 
making (the presentation and discussion of proposals) and as places for decision mak-
ing (voting on proposals and policy decisions). In some cases, a platform party can 
also take on a stratarchical type of structure. 
 
                                            
4 The selectorate is the set of individuals that can choose a candidate (as in the case of the 
primaries) or elect him/her (in the case of an electoral procedure). The selectorate goes from 
a maximum (when it totally overlaps with the electorate) to a minimum (when it concerns only 
a power oligarchy or, indeed, the only leader). The selectorate of “open” primaries is theoret-
ically the entire electorate (the practice is very different for a number of reasons); what de-
cides candidates in an electoral system with blocked lists and without preferences is instead 
constituted by a small elite or by the sole party leader. 
5 Theoretically, anyway, there would be some differences between platform and digital party, 
even if in the current political debate, the two expressions are usually overlapped. We can 
simplistically say that a platform party is always digital whilst a digital party is not necessarily 
platform. 
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Figure 2: Characteristics of the mass party and of the platform party.  
Technologies respond efficiently to three different tendencies of contemporary politics. 
In fact, they can:  
a) influence the organizational models of participation;  
b) accelerate the processes of deconstruction of intermediary bodies;  
c) feed the perspective of liquid democracy (a really controversial concept, usually 
overlapping with that of “delegative democracy” – a merging of representative and di-
rect democracy – based upon the use of digital platforms, such as, for example, Liquid-
Feedback6).  
These three tendencies are not necessarily opposed to each other. Digital technol-
ogies, in fact, can contribute to the deconstruction of the “old” intermediate bodies and, 
at the same time, favour new organisational model of participation that are at the back-
ground of new party structures. At the same time, the so-called “liquid democracy”, 
and, in general, the use of digital participatory platforms can activate new forms of 
participation but also contribute to a radical change in the party’s organisation. Digital 
technologies  can be tools for: a) mobilisation, b) policy making, c) decision making. 
 
Country Political Parties 
France Parti Socialiste 
France Insoumise 
Italy Partito Democratico 
Liberi e Uguali 
Portugal Partido Socialista 
Partido Comunista Português 
Spain Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol 
Podemos 
USA Democratic Socialists of America 
Table 1. Political parties analysed.  
                                            
6 See: https://liquidfeedback.org/ on the experiences of the Pirate Parties across Europe. There 
are also some connections between liquid democracy and the idea of liquid modernity (Bau-
man 1999). 
Mass integration 
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tradition)
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Following this simple taxonomy, we have been studying the use of digital platforms by 
a) parties inspired by socialism in Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and the USA; b) bot-
tom-up social movements. The analysis has been framed in an empirical approach 
based on the analysis of organisations on the one hand and on the content analysis 
(Evaluation Assertion Analysis) of the political and/or policy documents on the use of 
digital as a tool for political struggle. 
The analysis has been conducted in respect to the political parties listed in Table 1. 
The Democratic Socialists of America have been considered only as a “control var-
iable”. Any comparison with the left-wing parties of Southern Europe is in fact almost 
impossible7. 
 
 Name Mobilisation Policy 
making 
Decision 
making 
Organisational 
tool 
W A 
Parti Socialiste Conseil Citoyen 
(*) 
YES YES NO YES Y N 
Social media YES  
France Insoumise Plateform d’ac-
tion 
YES YES YES Partly Y N 
Social media YES  
Partito Demo-
cratico 
Bob (**) NO NO NO YES N Y 
PdApp YES YES NO Partly N Y 
Social media YES  
Liberi e Uguali Un partito di 
Sinistra (***) 
YES YES NO NO Y N 
Social media YES  
Partido Socialista Social media YES  
Partido Comunista 
Português 
Youtube channel YES  Y Y 
Social media YES  
Partido Socialista 
Obrero Espanol 
miPSOE YES YES NO YES Y Y 
Social media YES  
Podemos Particìpa YES YES YES YES Y N 
Social media YES  
Democratic So-
cialists of America 
Social media YES  YES  
 
(*) = Initiative launched by Benoît Hamon, presidential candidate at 2017 Presidential Elections 
(**) = Launched in 2017, then discontinued 
(***) = Semi-official platform (LeU is not a party but a cartel of left-wing parties) 
W = web; A = App 
Table 2: Tools used by political parties for functions and type 
The first element to underline is the substantial absence of co-ordinated digital actions. 
Mostly, the tools are functional to mobilisation practices and work essentially as ele-
ments of support for political communication. Democratic platforms of participation are 
                                            
7 The DSA constitutes an interesting example of the merging of two workplaces: the web (as a 
space of struggle) and the local communities (through the “community chapters”) as a site of 
proposal and organisation. 
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constitute a minority in the total number of technologies employed. In the Iberian pen-
insula there are the most radical developments: on the one hand, the use of digital 
technologies has taken root in Spain thanks to the success of Podemos (Caruso 2017) 
and the ability of the Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE, the Socialist Party) to 
intercept a demand for innovation. Podemos was over time transformed from a party-
platform to a party that uses a platform; PSOE, tried to use social media and its app 
(and a web-based platform too) as tool of a counter-storytelling to offer a partly different 
answer to Podemos.   
On the other hand, there is Portugal (a country in which, moreover, there are many 
platforms for participation for civic uses) where left-wing parties (winners of the 2019 
political elections) seem to devote more energy to activity in offline space and the (very 
active) use the dominant social media platforms. In particular, the Socialist Party uses 
Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, has a YouTube channel and even a Pinterest account; 
the Communist Party uses Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, has a YouTube channel and 
also WhatsApp as source of information (similarly to how PSOE in Spain uses a Tele-
gram channel).   
In France, the “participatory programme” experiments launched by Benoît Hamon 
in 2017 did not find a follow-up in the Socialist Party's projects (perhaps due to the 
party's electoral decline). However, the platform launched by France Insoumise moves 
from the level of mobilisation to spaces where concrete proposals are developed and 
active deliberation processes take place. At least in part the platform is an aspect of 
France Insoumise’s organisational modality8. 
There is a substantial absence of specific documents and policies on the use of 
digital technologies, above all at the organisational level. This seems apparently con-
trasting with the parties’ effort to activate consensus and mobilisation through social 
media9. 
Greater attention seems to be given to digital participation in Italy, where, however, 
the socialist-inspired parties have not had (at the moment) great successes in the 
adoption of digital technologies: alongside social media – a “continuous bass” of all 
parties’ communication activities – there are only the apps produced by the Democratic 
Party (but not a web platform10) and the interesting but unsuccessful attempts of the 
Liberi e Uguali (LeU, Free and Equal) platforms (and even before that of Sinistra Ital-
iana-Italian Left, one of the small parties that then gave life to LeU in 2018) . 
In none of the parties under analysis – at least in the official documents concerning 
the use of digital and its relations with political organisation and with the exception of 
the Portuguese parties – there are references to the use of a Marxist (or post-Marxist) 
perspective on technology and communication, although in Marxist theory there have 
been many reflections on this topic from the first stage of Cultural Studies, to some 
approaches of political economy of the media (Smythe 1977), until the most recent 
                                            
8 Our analysis only takes into account the possibility of the different dimensions. No analysis 
has been conducted on their effective achievement. 
9 This part has been realised treating the parties’ organisational documents as political dis-
course and using a simplified form of Evaluative Assertion Analysis. Due to the limited pres-
ence of the discourse “on digital”, the semantic evaluation differentials are not discrimina-
tory. This is, anyway, an important outcome, even if not as expected. 
10 This fact is even more contradictory considering that the Democratic Party (directly or 
through initiatives promoted by their MPs) was one of the first to launch some pioneering 
web-based platforms of participation. Other Italian experiences of the use of digital plat-
forms are those of the small Pirate Party and of Five-Star Movement: this article, anyway, 
focuses only on parties coming from or belonging to the socialist tradition. 
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perspectives of the Marxian study of social media and digital technologies and, more 
in general, of Internet studies. A very comprehensive and accurate overview of the 
Internet Studies in a Marxian perspective is available in Fuchs and Dyer-Witheford 
(2012; see also Fuchs 2014, 73)11.  
Different perspectives are present in the area of social movements and, in particu-
lar, in those positioning themselves “on the left”. Both in the first interviews conducted 
with the activists of various social movements and in the results of similar research that 
we have conducted over the last three years, a different awareness has emerged with 
respect to the role of digital communication technologies. Along with positions of sus-
picion towards communication (which appear minoritarian anyway), there is growing 
awareness that digital ecosystems are spaces for struggle, as we will try to argument 
in the next section. 
5. Digital Socialism: A Challenge for Social Movements and Political Parties 
The crisis of legitimacy of the left – and especially of the socialist/labourist and/or so-
cial-democratic parties – derives from many factors, not least their acquiescence to the 
economic dictates of neoliberalism and the progressive marginalisation of themes such 
as socialism, social justice, equality, and the democratisation of society in their political 
programmes and agenda. The complex question of the cleavage of the sentimental 
connection (Gramsci, Quaderno XVIII, now in Gramsci 1971, 135-136) between parties 
that stand in the socialist tradition and the popular classes constitutes one of the most 
important points of discussion among scholars and also politicians. The new tools of 
democratic participation represent a great opportunity for developing dynamics of in-
clusiveness. It is not enough to adopt the structure of the party-platform. Rather, in-
stead, it would be useful to merge the dimension of the net (as a tool) with a territorial 
presence in the offline world capable of starting from the needs of society.  
One of the elements that left-wing parties have not always understood is that there 
is no contradiction between the practices of digital democracy and the processes of 
participation in territorial realities offline. Digital participatory platforms can be used 
alongside “apps” for facilitating the involvement of citizens and activists. A greater ter-
ritorial involvement can in turn determine the growth of active individuals online and 
offline, creating a virtuous circle of participation that may be intermittent but not occa-
sional. In this perspective, digital platforms can offer tools for mobilisation, can act as 
spaces for facilitating policy making and, finally, they can favour the adoption of more 
democratic decision-making mechanisms.  
Mobilisation, shared formation of public policies and decisions taken with a demo-
cratic method are characteristic and peculiar elements of the socialist tradition. Digital 
technologies can be extraordinary tools for rooting and spreading socialist values. It is 
necessary to place communication technologies and architectures within shared rules 
of transparency and to enable democratic access in order to avoid the drift of the plat-
form parties that preach direct online democracy to erase participatory democracy and 
the development of a real egalitarian democracy. In other words, it is necessary to 
remember that technologies are not neutral and their use –  in one sense or another – 
is a political act. Adopting these technologies to the logic of online deliberation, for 
example, and not to the aggregative logic of online direct democracy (Mosca 2018), 
would mean, moreover, empowering the voices of the people who are without voice 
                                            
11 Some prejudices on Marx’s work (see Eagleton 2011) are probably present also in many 
“post-marxist” political parties.  
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and often without representation. But also the risk of the “platformization” of society is 
very strong (van Dijck, Poell and De Waal 2018). 
Probably the most lively and plural area in the political use of digital technologies is 
that of social movements. In this area – as effectively noted by Stefania Milan (2013) 
– different ways of using communication technologies can be identified. It is no coinci-
dence that also in the academic field different definitions have been used, often par-
tially overlapping, sometimes clearly distinct: in fact, alongside the use of the expres-
sion “media activism”, we find works that can be framed in the field of “alternative me-
dia” or even “non-mainstream media” (Pasquali and Sorice 2005), or those that refer 
to the effective category of “emancipatory communication practices” (Milan 2013), or 
as well as those that tend to relate media research to the studies on democratisation. 
In our analysis, we found very different experiences of social movements, which in 
some cases have developed bottom-up democratic innovation practices: from civic en-
gagement groups (halfway between social movements and active citizenship prac-
tices) to one issue pressure groups that also carry out lobbying activities without nec-
essarily acting as interest groups (as in the case of Stop-TTIP movement12). The ex-
amples include fair trade organisations, struggles for housing rights or for “riders’ 
rights”. They have some common characteristics, such as a participatory and non-
centralised organisation (della Porta and Rucht 2013, 2), a polycentric and inclusive 
organisation, and the production of knowledge about digital capitalism (Pavan and 
Mainardi 2019). Such movements are agents of democratic communication. This last 
point is very important for our purposes because these movements adopt democratic 
practices that are not limited to the logic of representation. At the same time, social 
movements can be defined by referring to the fact that: 1) they are mainly informal 
interaction networks; 2) they have shared beliefs and activate dynamics of solidarity; 
3) they mobilise around conflicting issues; 4) they adopt various and differentiated 
forms of protest, often of a “creative” type (Micheletti and McFarland 2016) and very 
often use digital technologies as tools and spaces of struggle. 
This last point is very important because digital tools and more generally commu-
nication practices play a key role in social movements. Donatella della Porta (2013, 
92) notes that 
in recent reflections linking communication and participatory democratic quality, 
the focus of attention is not so much (or no longer) on the abstract “power of the 
media”, but more on the relations between media and publics: the ways in which 
“people exercise their agency in relation to media flows” (Couldry 2006, 27). 
Media practices therefore become central, not only as the practices of the media 
actors, but more broadly as what various actors do in relations with the media, 
including activists’ media practices. 
One of the respondents in our interviews argued in this context: 
The point is not to use social media or not; it is clear that those are for profit and 
are functional to the logic of capitalist accumulation […] they impose their ideol-
ogy [..]. They are spaces to be used tactically. But at the same time, we should 
                                            
12 This type of movement is also playing an important role in “re-politicising the institutional 
politics”. In this perspective, for example, we can interpret the recent action at European 
Ombudsman, activated by Stop-TTIP and No-Ceta activists, who have also played an infor-
mation role for the European Parliament. An innovative case of “re-politicisation” of the rep-
resentation promoted by social movements with an impact on parliamentary institutions. 
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try to organise alternative spaces of struggle, but this is only possible in an in-
ternational perspective (F, 27) 
There are several interesting experiences that go beyond the contrast between mass 
integration parties to which almost all socialist political parties belong and platform par-
ties. Social movements are interesting field of social research. They could also consti-
tute an important site to re-connect media studies with the Marxian approach  that was 
too hastily abandoned in the second half of the 1980s by postmodern and culturalist 
approaches. 
6. An Open Conclusion 
We must admit that we are unable to provide a clear answer on the use of digital com-
munication by different collective actors such as political parties inspired by socialism 
and radical social movements. Some of the data is contradictory, so more research is 
needed. The transformative dimension of capitalism makes exhaustive analysis diffi-
cult. The very transformative nature of capitalism has allowed the use of expressions 
such as “digital socialism” on the part of the “owners” of media/technology companies 
(Morozov 2019). In many cases, capitalism “with a human face” has offered spaces 
that are economically profitable and that digital capital presents as democratic achieve-
ments but that given their subsumption under capital have a limited potential as spaces 
for struggle. Neoliberal ideology has succeeded in incorporating tools and experiences 
of online participation. Platforms of participation have often become instruments of 
mere consultation used by capitalist organisations and bureaucracies so that digital 
technologies are reduced to function as tools that make capitalism and public admin-
istration more efficient. This is the perspective of the New Public Management ap-
proach that does not aim at providing spaces for citizens’ democratic participation. 
There are three reasons why left-wing parties have not managed to come up with 
alternatives: 1) there is an organisational similarity among these parties  that produces 
the homogenisation of perception and the idea that old structures cannot be modified; 
2) participation is practiced and understood in manners that do not really  encourage 
participation, but only promote engagement; 3) there is a weakness of deliberative 
processes. A further hypothesis to test is that the model of online participation is so 
steeped in digital capitalism that it leaves no way out. 
In this scenario, left-wing parties do not yet seem to have succeeded in providing 
an alternative framework for digital communication that goes beyond digital capitalism 
and, sometimes, do not even understand the importance of communication not just in 
the transformations of  capitalism that have resulted in the emergence of digital capi-
talism but also in and for a renewed socialist project. 
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